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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Edwards, and members of the Subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on one of the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) most important and foundational programs, the Integrated Risk Information
System (IRIS). Let me get straight to the point. These days, the more important a public health
program, the more likely it is to be the subject of relentless, intemperate, and unjustified attacks.
IRIS is no exception. What is in fact a sober, well-informed, and carefully conducted scientific
effort to synthesize existing research in order to set reference doses for the most toxic chemicals
is portrayed by industry lobbyists as an anti-scientific effort to “demonize” such ostensibly
benign substances as arsenic, formaldehyde, and dioxin. This deliberate misreading of the
science by industry lobbyists is intended to prolong Americans’ exposure to dangerous
substances in the service of corporate profit, while at the same time immobilizing the federal
agency best qualified to protect public health, the EPA.
The truth is that everyone attending this hearing would be hard-pressed to come up with
more than a dozen examples of toxic chemicals that have been found to be significantly less
harmful than we originally thought when additional research was done. The powerful historic
trend moves strongly in the opposite direction: as the research has accumulated, chemicals like
dioxin, arsenic, formaldehyde, cadmium, mercury, and lead prove to be more toxic than we first
imagined. Endless efforts to deconstruct individual studies should not obscure this trend, as the
chemical industry was well aware until the current backlash against regulation offered it new
opportunities to defeat safeguards that protect public health by distorting EPA’s track record.
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IRIS started as an internal EPA database used to develop toxicological profiles for
common chemicals. These profiles set the reference dose, or RfD, for a given chemical on the
basis of existing scientific literature. An RfD is the amount below which human exposure is
deemed unlikely to cause adverse health effects. Over time, IRIS has become an invaluable
resource: It receives some 2,000 internet visits a day, testament to its importance as among the
best, most comprehensive databases for this kind of baseline information. And, although IRIS
itself most definitely is not a regulatory program, it provides a strong scientific foundation for
much of the rest of the agency’s work. Without the scientific determinations IRIS contains, EPA
would be hard-pressed to develop standards for the control of emissions of toxic chemicals that
cause brain damage, cardiovascular illness, reproductive dysfunction, cancer, and a range of
other diseases. Delaying the production of IRIS profiles costs lives and endangers public health,
an intolerable outcome that this Committee must not allow to happen.
My testimony today makes four points about the future of the IRIS program:
•

From the American public’s perspective, the central and urgent problem with IRIS
is not that it rushes to judgment on toxic chemicals. Far from it. The problem is
that repeated rounds of redundant “peer review” and interagency comment allow –
in fact, invite –chemical manufacturers, the Department of Defense, and other selfinterested parties to slow the program to a crawl. Because these delays help to
ensure that dangerous chemicals are left in commerce for years longer than necessary,
people suffer avoidable diseases and irrevocable neurological and reproductive
damage. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has repeatedly warned
Congress about the negative implications of these delays. See, e.g., GAO-08-6743T,
EPA’s New Assessment Process Will Increase Challenges EPA Faces in Evaluating
and Regulating Chemicals (April 29, 2008) and GAO-09-271, HIGH-RISK SERIES,
An Update (January 2009). GAO has placed the EPA chemicals program in the
“high risk” category reserved for a small number of the most troubled programs in
government. It made this important decision in part because IRIS updates are so slow
that the data base risks becoming obsolete. It did not make any reference to the
distorted critique of EPA science that the chemical industry has developed.

•

Given that IRIS is constantly struggling to avoid capture by the chemical industry
and, if anything, gives manufacturers far too many opportunities to befuddle final
assessments, the chemical industry’s sudden discovery of its flaws is as
opportunistic as it is incredible.

•

The National Research Council’s (NRC) report on formaldehyde does not justify
the radical changes sought by the industry. In fact, the NRC explicitly endorsed
the program’s continuation and improvement. Its critique of the formaldehyde
assessment constitutes robust peer review, not an outright condemnation of the
program and EPA science as industry witnesses would have you believe. I wish that
the NRC committee had not adopted such a haughty tone in scolding EPA staff. But
that tone was the product of political naiveté regarding how its report would be
exploited in the existing political climate. It cannot fairly be characterized as a
recommendation that IRIS stop—or even slow—its critical work.
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•

The remedies sought by the American Chemistry Council (ACC) are designed to
run IRIS off the road, further undermining EPA’s mission to protect public health.
I urge the Committee to side with the public, not the manufacturers of toxic
chemicals long overdue for assessment and control.

I am a law professor at the University of Maryland School of Law and the President of
the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) (http://www.progressivereform.org/). Founded in
2002, CPR is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit research and educational organization comprising a network
of sixty scholars across the nation who are dedicated to protecting health, safety, and the
environment through analysis and commentary. I joined academia mid-career, after seven years
as an attorney at the Federal Trade Commission, five years as staff counsel to the House Energy
and Commerce Committee, and seven years representing small and mid-sized electric utilities.
My work on environmental regulation includes four books, and over twenty-seven articles (as
author or co-author). My most recent book, published by the University of Chicago Press, is
The People's Agents and the Battle to Protect the American Public: Special Interests,
Government, and Threats to Health, Safety, and the Environment, which I co-authored with
Professor Sidney Shapiro of Wake Forest University’s School of Law, analyzes the state of the
regulatory system that protects public health, worker and consumer safety, and natural resources,
concluding that these agencies are under-funded, lack adequate legal authority, and are
undermined by political pressure motivated by special interests. I have served as a consultant to
EPA and have testified previously before Congress on regulatory subjects on numerous
occasions.

Saving IRIS
Since 2005, Member Scholars at the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) have
researched and written five white papers regarding IRIS and the need to streamline the process
for developing toxicological profiles and several letters to decision makers concerned about the
program’s future. They are available here: http://www.progressivereform.org/IRIS.cfm, and I
have attached the two most recent reports, Corrective Lenses for IRIS and Setting Priorities for
IRIS to this testimony. Our key findings include:
1. IRIS is woefully incomplete. EPA is many years behind in completing profiles of at
least 255 chemicals. Some 109 chemical profiles that EPA was required by the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 to have completed by 2008 are either included in IRIS
but missing critical elements, or entirely absent from the database. A similarly sad
situation afflicts the agency’s efforts to carry out the statutory mandates of the Safe
Drinking Water Act. Every five years, EPA generates a new Contaminant Candidate
List (CCL). The lists contain recommendations both for chemicals and
microbiological contaminants. Since 1996, EPA has published three CCLs that
contain 156 distinct chemical substances. IRIS profiles are missing for 64 (41
percent) of these substances.
2. So severe are the delays in the IRIS process that a 2008 GAO report warned that the
Bush Administration’s approach to IRIS, which resulted in just two completed
profiles per year, left the database at risk of becoming obsolete. (The report is
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available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08743t.pdf.) To its credit, the Obama
Administration revised the IRIS process in an effort to speed the production of
assessments, and has managed to increase the number of completed profiles to nine
annually. But although this performance is a definite improvement, the rate of
production is still slow enough that, if nothing else is done to improve the pace of
IRIS, EPA will not catch up with its existing backlog for another 55 years.
3. One area of particular concern is that the Obama Administration’s new IRIS process
left in place many of the roadblocks GAO had previously identified, including
interagency review of individual assessments, multiple reviews by outside science
panels, and prioritization of a few high-profile assessments at the expense of faster
assessments. Potentially regulated parties, including other federal agencies like the
Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, have
targeted IRIS as a choke point for regulation. The labyrinthine process they have
demanded, diagrammed on page 9 of the Corrective Lenses report, contains multiple
rounds of peer review, public comment, and interagency review that are as redundant
as they are time-consuming. In effect, the program suffers from the problem of
“information capture”—a phenomenon where potentially regulated industries and
their federal agency clients submit so much irrelevant data to EPA, and do so with
such frequency, that new assessments become mired in never-ending controversy.
4. To close data gaps and reestablish IRIS’s credibility as a cutting-edge database, EPA
needs to make four changes. First, EPA should reduce the procedural burdens that
were formalized during the Bush administration. Second, EPA must articulate clear,
statute-driven priorities about which assessments to complete to ensure that data gaps
in statutory mandates would be more quickly addressed. Third, the IRIS process
must be restructured to allow for timely assessments to be written on the basis of the
weight of available evidence at the time an assessment is undertaken. Fourth, EPA
must have adequate resources—and use those resources efficiently--to complete a
much larger number of assessments.
One additional point is worth making. The chemicals we are talking about here are the
worst of the worst, produced in amounts of millions of pounds annually. As just one example,
chromium compounds, which are categorized in the worst ten percent of all toxic chemicals and
are among the hazardous air pollutants missing from IRIS, are emitted in amounts exceeding 58
million pounds annually. Unsafe exposure to chromium compounds causes cancer, suppresses
immune systems, and harms kidney and respiratory functions. Over the last several years,
industry has sponsored several studies of chromium. When a study documents adverse effects at
common levels of exposure, the sponsors commission a second study designed to rip apart the
first. Unfortunately, the victims of this endless treadmill are neither the sponsors, nor the
scientists engaged in chasing each other’s tails, but rather the public’s health.

Industry Influence over IRIS
Anyone who has observed IRIS for many years cannot help but find the chemical
industry’s recent denunciations of the program disingenuous, even surreal. Far from being
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helpless bystanders in the process, industry members have been in the thick of the action since
the database was initiated, submitting the research they think most important and repeatedly
advocating their view of the research to IRIS staff, more senior EPA officials, sympathetic
federal agencies and departments, and the White House Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA). To whatever extent that IRIS science is flawed, the people complaining about
those flaws are full partners in its development. In fact, one reason why IRIS profiles have
ballooned into unmanageable length is the reaction of EPA staff to constant harassment by
industry participants.

The Formaldehyde Review
The NRC conducted a robust peer review of the draft IRIS formaldehyde assessment.
The report is written in the detailed language of one group of scientists giving another group of
scientists an unvarnished assessment of how a scientific finding could be revised and bolstered.
Its work will undoubtedly improve the IRIS process, and EPA is already taking its
recommendations to heart.
Unfortunately, the NRC reviewers also succumbed to the fatal attraction of reiterating
their professional superiority, using tough, even haughty language to critique EPA’s work, and
exhibiting a remarkable level of insensitivity to how their comments would be interpreted in the
over-heated political atmosphere that afflicts the nation’s Capitol these days. Clearly, the NRC
committee was trying to help IRIS staff to do better, not to immobilize the program. Consider
the following direct quotes from the NRC report:
The draft IRIS assessment correctly concludes that formaldehyde is a genotoxic (DNAreactive) chemical that causes cytogenetic effects, such as mutations. (emphasis added)
(p. 4)
The committee recognizes that revision of the approach will involve an extensive effort
by EPA staff and others, and it is not recommending that EPA delay the revision of the
formaldehyde assessment to implement a new approach. However, models for conducting
IRIS assessments more effectively and efficiently are available, and the committee
provides several examples in the present report. Thus, EPA might be able to make
changes in its process relatively quickly by selecting and adapting existing approaches.
(emphasis added) (p. 11)
As a person who teaches for a living, I would urge future NRC panels to keep in mind
how much self-important scolding can interfere with a student’s learning process—we all know
that truth in our academic lives but may forget it when we enter the policymaking world.
Regardless, Congress would make a grave error if, at the behest of self-interested chemical
manufacturers, it ignored the stated goals of the NRC’s review.
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Excessive Remedies
The remedies proposed by the chemical industry representatives here today confuse and
distort the core purposes of IRIS. For example, one of the most intemperate proposals advanced
by the American Chemistry Council is that the OIRA increase its oversight of the program.
OIRA is the division within the White House that checks agency cost-benefit analyses. It is
staffed almost exclusively by economists who have no better idea of what constitutes a good RfD
than any other lay person. Two scientists work at OIRA, in comparison to the dozens of wellqualified scientists representing multiple disciplines who work at EPA. The recommendation
that OIRA be put in charge of IRIS is not designed to improve the program’s scientific validity,
but rather is intended to give chemical manufacturers a sympathetic forum where they can tie
IRIS in knots more easily.
A second industry demand voiced by ACC is that NRC be brought in to review all IRIS
assessments. NRC is the gold standard for peer review and, as I mentioned earlier, its critiques
are always interesting. On the other hand, the academic scientists who serve on NRC review
committees receive compensation that does not nearly pay for their time. Instead, they are
motivated by a commitment to public service, the pleasure of engaging with bright and
sophisticated colleagues, and the prestige of serving by invitation on a panel convened by the
finest scientific institution in the nation. Using NRC to run around double-checking government
work would corrode this delicate balance, ultimately rendering it unworkable. Not incidentally,
it would also add unreasonable delay to an already dangerously slow process. I hope that the
NRC recognizes the insidious implications of this recommendation and strongly opposes it.
The invocation of NRC, and the National Academies as a whole, has become a common
practice for potentially regulated parties who hope to slow down EPA decision making. The
little-recognized hypocrisy of this practice is that when NRC ratifies EPA’s judgments without
qualification, aggrieved industry participants simply ignore its findings and proceed with their
campaign against the agency. So, for example, NRC issued a report on mercury that was fully
supportive of the RfD that EPA had set for the substance. (The NRC report is available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309071402.) The electric utilities fighting EPA’s
regulatory efforts simply ignored the NRC report as if it had never been completed, continuing
their attacks on the research underlying the agency’s decision. Far from serving as an umpire in
heated disputes, NRC was exploited as a tool to delay final action and then promptly cast aside.
The final, penultimate example of overreaction that will endanger public health is the
rider now pending in the House Appropriations Committee. It would bar EPA from moving
forward with future assessments until all existing assessments had been revised to conform to the
NRC’s advice about the formaldehyde assessment. This proposal would paralyze the IRIS
program for the foreseeable future by forcing its staff to engage in a massive round of paper
shuffling.
In a surprisingly successful effort to obscure the real motivations behind these radical
suggestions, regulated industries have portrayed them as essential to job creation, and therefore
of direct benefit to the average American. Fundamental to this set of claims is the notion that
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regulatory excesses in these times of economic recession have hit industry so hard that its
members cannot afford to expand their businesses and put people back to work. But some quick
research on the percentage increase in profits from 2009 to 2010 for some of the ACC’s largest
members yielded surprising results.
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Company
Fortune 500 Rank
Increase in Profit 2009 to 2010
Dow
45
19.4%
Dupont
84
19.98%
PPG Industries
181
9.7%
Praxair
241
13.0%
Air Products & Chemicals
271
7.7%
Ashland
272
11.2%
Eastman Chemical
348
32.6%
Avery Dennison
356
9.4%
Celanese
388
16.5%
Lubrizol
423
18.1%
Source: CNN Money, Issue date: May 23, 2011,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/industries/7/index.html

Rules to protect public health and the environment most definitely do not have the effect
of sweeping money into a pile and setting it on fire. Rather, they save the lives of millions of
people, prevent many more millions from getting sick or becoming sicker, and preserve the
irreplaceable natural resources without which human life would be impossible.
For example, Clean Air Act regulations are uniformly recognized as a wonderful
economic bargain by honest experts from all points on the political spectrum. According to
EPA’s very conservative numbers, which dramatically understate benefits and overstate costs,
clean air rules saved 164,300 adult lives in 2010, and will save 237,000 lives annually by 2020.
EPA estimates that the economic value of Clean Air Act regulatory controls will be $2 trillion
annually by 2020; costs of compliance in that year will be $65 billion. Air pollution controls
saved 13 million days of work loss and 3.2 million days of school loss in 2010. By 2020, they
will save 17 million work loss days and 5.4 million school loss days. I emphasize that EPA’s
cost estimates are based on extraordinarily conservative assumptions regarding regulatory
benefits. For example, EPA says that a non-fatal heart attack in a person 0-24 years old is worth
only $84,000 and that an emergency room visit to treat an asthma attack is worth only $363 per
incident—hospitals don’t give you a plastic ID bracelet for that little.
And according to OIRA, which houses the staff of economists so embraced by ACC, “the
estimated annual benefits of major federal regulations are in the aggregate between $132 billion
and $655 billion, while the estimated annual costs are in the aggregate between $44 billion and
$62 billion.” (See
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf.)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Edwards. I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have.
Attachments:
1. CPR Report, Corrective Lenses for IRIS
2. CPR Report, Setting Priorities for IRIS
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Executive Summary
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS)
is the most important toxicological database in the world. Not only is it the single most
comprehensive database of human health information about toxic substances, it also serves
as a gateway to regulation, as well as to a range of public and private sector efforts to protect
against toxic substances. IRIS “profiles” of individual substances include a number of
scientific assessments of the substance’s toxicity to humans by various means of exposure –
by inhalation, contact with the skin, and so on. Federal regulators rely on the assessments to
do their important work protecting the public, as do state and local environmental protection
authorities, and industry itself.
For EPA, the assessments conducted to complete profiles of particular toxic substances for
IRIS provide the authoritative underpinnings for a wide range of regulatory actions under
the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). At the state and
local level, IRIS profiles are the basis for regulation of toxic substances. For example, the
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality used IRIS values in its Portland Air Toxics
Assessment, conducted in 2006.1 The Portland Air Toxics Assessment modeled ambient air
concentrations of 12 pollutants at a highly localized level. Rather than having to rely on EPA’s
county-level assessment of toxic air pollutants, Oregon officials can now estimate exposure
and risk at a neighborhood level and set permit allowances accordingly. In the private sector,
IRIS information may be used in toxic tort suits, or by individuals or public interest groups to
advocate for lower permissible permit levels under Title V of the CAA.
Unfortunately, IRIS is woefully incomplete. EPA is many years behind in meeting statutory
mandates for completing profiles of at least 255 chemicals, and as a result regulatory and
enforcement action related to those chemicals has been stalled. Some chemical profiles in
IRIS are missing information essential to regulatory action. In addition, 77 of the hazardous
air pollutants (HAPs) listed in IRIS are missing the most important piece of information
– an assessment of how much of the substance may be safely inhaled. In all, some 109
chemical profiles that EPA was required by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 to
have completed by 2008 are either included in IRIS but missing critical elements, or entirely
absent from the database. So severe is the delay in the IRIS process that a 2008 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report warned that the Bush Administration’s approach to
IRIS, which resulted in just two completed profiles per year, left the database at risk of
becoming obsolete.2
In May 2009, newly appointed EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson introduced reforms she
predicted would improve EPA’s performance with respect to IRIS that included making it
harder for other agencies of the federal government to slow down or exert undue influence
over EPA’s assessment of the environmental health effects of substances listed in IRIS. The
Administrator’s stated goal was to ensure completion of new assessments in 23 months, but
she made no promises about how many assessments EPA would complete in a year. Neither
Corrective Lenses for IRIS: Reforms to Improve EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System
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did she present any plan for clearing the backlog of the 478 assessments that are in process,
nor mention that EPA has long since been required by statute to complete, or have been
identified as out of date by EPA staff.3
In the year since the new process has been in effect, EPA has made only modest progress
completing assessments, finishing nine assessments in 2009 – up from the Bush pace of
two per year – but still slow enough that, if it does nothing to improve its performance,
EPA will not catch up with its backlog for another 55 years. Moreover, it is not clear from
information available to the public whether the agency is fulfilling Jackson’s 23-month pledge
on individual IRIS assessments.
One area of particular concern is that the Administrator’s new IRIS process left in place
many of the roadblocks GAO had previously identified, including interagency review of
individual assessments, multiple reviews by outside science panels, and prioritization of a
few high-profile assessments at the expense of faster assessments.4 The consequence is that
significant data gaps are still a serious problem.
Specifically, the IRIS database is missing important human health information about the
toxicological effects of HAPs, drinking water contaminants, and chemicals commonly found
in Superfund toxic waste sites.
• Thirty-two HAPs regulated under the CAA are not listed in IRIS at all, and
77 HAPs lack inhalation values, hampering the air office’s ability to do the
“residual risk assessments” that ensure technology-based standards provide
an “ample margin of safety.”5
The Human Consequence of the IRIS Breakdown
The ramifications of the large-scale breakdown of the IRIS
process are very real. For example, residents of the Marine
Corps Base Camp Lejeune have been exposed to high levels
of trichloroethylene for decades. A Navy-funded study of
increased cancer risk for children born at Camp Lejeune
found 14 cases of Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia in a cohort
of 10,000-12,000 births, or more than 100 times the expected rate.
EPA drafted an updated IRIS assessment of trichloroethylene in 2001, but it was challenged by the Department of
Defense (DOD). Under pressure from DOD, EPA commissioned a National Academy of Sciences Review of trichloroethylene. In 2007, five Senators introduced a bill instructing EPA to complete the trichloroethylene assessment and
issue a drinking water standard for trichloroethylene. The
bill was reported in the Senate, but has not passed in either
chamber.
The Department of Defense objects to lowering the exposure limit for trichloroethylene because of the resulting

increased cleanup costs. DOD estimates it would cost $5
billion more to clean up trichloroethylene if the drinking
water standard went from five parts per billion to one part
per billion.
Toward that end, DOD submitted 72 pages of comments to
EPA’s Nov. 2009 draft assessment of trichloroethylene. The
new draft assessment will undergo review by the Science
Advisory Board in 2010.
Meanwhile, EPA’s IRIS assessment of trichloroethylene is still
pending. Residents of Camp Lejeune continue to be exposed to high levels of trichloroethylene in drinking water,
and cannot successfully prove these levels are harmful until
EPA finishes this work.
— House of Representatives Committee on Science and
Technology. Toxic Communities: How EPA’s IRIS Program
Fails the Public. (Jun. 12, 2008).
 Department of Defense. Comments on the Review of
—
Trichloroethylene. (Aug. 25, 2009).
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Tables 1 and 2: Hundreds of
millions of pounds of highly
toxic chemicals are released
each year without IRIS
numbers that would allow
EPA, state and local officials,
the media, and community
groups to gauge public health
hazards.

Three of 71 contaminants regulated under the SDWA are not listed, and an
additional 64 of 156 substances nominated to the Contaminant Candidate
List, slowing EPA’s ability to develop enforceable standards for drinking
water contaminants.
Of the 275 substances the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
has identified as “high profile” based on their frequency of occurrence at
Superfund sites, toxicity, and potential for human exposure, 87
Table 1: Top Ten Hazardous Air
Pollutants with No IRIS Information1
(32 percent) are not listed.6

The sources of delay have not changed: priority treatment of complex, highprofile assessments at the expense of other needed assessments; excessive
interagency review; involvement of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA); industry interference; and recursive, formalized outside
review continue to contribute to the small number of IRIS assessments
completed each year.

Chemical

Total Air
Releases (lbs)

Chromium compounds

58,875,719

Ethylene oxide

19,326,422

Chloroprene

6,917,570

Diethanolamine

5,292,937

Ethyl acrylate

4,536,125

The interagency review process is one of the largest sources of delay. It
provides agencies, which are often also potentially regulated entities, with
multiple opportunities to influence and soften EPA’s risk assessments and
reduce future regulatory burdens. Even under the new process, federal
agencies, coordinated by OIRA, have two special opportunities to comment
on draft IRIS assessments. EPA has the discretion to terminate the
interagency review process, which is unusual and would not be tolerated at
other agencies. The DOD, for example, would not allow EPA to comment
on decisions about training because of concerns about hazardous pollution.

Cobalt compounds

4,502,987

Titanium tetrachloride

3,603,494

Cadmium compounds

1,736,020

To close data gaps and reestablish IRIS’s credibility as a cutting-edge database,
EPA needs to make four changes. First, EPA should reduce the procedural
burdens that were formalized during the Bush administration. Second,
EPA must articulate clear, statute-driven priorities about which assessments
to complete to ensure that data gaps in statutory mandates would be more
quickly addressed. Third, the IRIS process must be restructured to allow for
timely assessments made based on the weight-of-the-evidence at the time an
assessment is undertaken. Fourth, EPA must also have adequate resources
and make better use of its resources to complete a much larger number of
assessments than it is currently finishing each year.

Chemical

O-Toluidine

626,844

Hydrogen fluoride

526,486

Total

105,944,603

Table 2: Top Ten Hazardous Air
Pollutants with No Inhalation
Values in IRIS2

Methanol

Total Air
Releases (lbs)
112,091,055

Carbonyl sulfide

353,389

Formaldehyde

313,659

Chlorine

270,468

Dichloromethane

205,328

Phenol

53,622

Trichloroethylene

48,130

Tetrachloroethylene

40,888

Lead compounds
Administrator Jackson has repeatedly emphasized her commitment to use
Chloroform
EPA’s chemical management program to reinvigorate the agency’s public
7
Total
health responsibility. The IRIS program has featured prominently in her
discussion of these efforts. EPA has substantial latitude to reforms the
program and remove these obstacles to make it more productive. For Administrator Jackson
to be successful with chemical management, she will need to impose further reforms on the
IRIS process.

14,478
12,191
113,413,298
Figure 1,2 &3: Hearing on Fixing EPA’s
Broken Integrated Risk Information System,
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Science
and Technology (Jun. 11, 2009).
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Introduction
The IRIS database provides a number of important pieces of information about the human
health effects of specific toxic substances. These include specific oral and inhalation
“reference doses,” accounting for the effects of ingestion and inhalation of the substance,
as well as a “cancer slope factor” that measures the risk of cancer associated with exposure
to increasing concentrations of a substance. EPA relies on this information in developing
regulations to protect Americans from a variety of risks, fulfilling its statutory mandate
under several laws, including parts of the Clean Air Act (CAA), Safe Drinking Water Act
(SWDA), Superfund and other statutes. IRIS is widely used, not just by EPA, but also by
state, local, and international public health experts, as well as toxic tort attorneys. In all, the
online version of IRIS receives approximately 20,000 hits per day.
Originally, IRIS was an internal EPA database, aggregating human health information
collected by various offices within the agency. But the assessments grew to be so vital to
the regulatory process and other risk-management decisions, that advocates for industry and
the public interest began targeting IRIS assessments. In response, EPA has restructured
the IRIS process three times since 2004. In doing so, EPA struggled to balance the need to
complete IRIS assessments quickly with the desire to produce assessments that are so robust
as to be immunized against criticism from outside interests.
EPA has failed to develop a process that can achieve this balance between providing
information in a timely fashion so that the agency can get on with its work and attempting to
generate definitive answers that demand a level of finality and precision that science cannot
produce. The resulting IRIS assessment process has injected additional burdens, including
interagency review coordinated by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) and recursive critique by outside scientists. These additional requirements
slowed EPA productivity so significantly that although the IRIS program received increased
funding from 2000 to 2007, the number of assessments completed in this period fell from
an average of five per year to two per year.8 After the Bush Administration’s final round
of reforms to the IRIS assessment process, congressional overseers estimated that it would
take EPA six to eight years to clear all of the procedural hurdles between initiation of an
assessment and its final posting in the public database.9
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Science and Technology identified three primary problems with the Bushera IRIS process: interagency review, multiple layers of science review, and EPA’s choice to
focus considerable resources on a few high profile assessments at the expense of progress
on others.10 In response, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced a new IRIS process
in May 2009. Jackson promised to regain control over interagency review and streamline
each step so that assessments would be completed in 23 months. She explained that the new
process would restore timely, transparent assessments in service of other actions to protect
public health.11 But Jackson’s focus on completing assessments in 23 months rather than
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whittling down the prodigious backlog of uncompleted assessments suggests that it might be
decades before the agency meets current statutory requirements whose deadlines have long
since passed.
Indeed, the new IRIS process has failed to meet these goals precisely because it retained
many of the same features of the old process. Interagency review of individual assessments,
industry efforts to hijack the process through Data Quality Act petitions, overuse of science
advisory boards, and a focus on high profile and complex assessments have all prevented
EPA from completing assessments in a timely and transparent way. For example, under the
new process, EPA releases written comments provided in the interagency review process, but
the documents do not provide a full picture of what transpires between the agencies because
they do not provide a record of telephone calls and other communications. And EPA’s
agenda for IRIS assessments has become less transparent, with less information available
about which substances will be assessed and the projected timeline for doing so.
With that in mind, this paper proposes five specific reforms to the IRIS process to make the
program more productive and able to complete a greater number of assessments each year:
1. EPA should adopt a transparent, statute-driven process for selecting
substances to be assessed.  
2. EPA should eliminate the interagency review process, which has largely
served to create additional opportunities for industry interference, without
adding significantly to the scientific discussion that should be at the heart of
EPA’s regulatory decision-making.

It might be
decades before
the agency meets
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requirements
whose deadlines
have long since
passed.

3. EPA should put faith in its own scientific expertise and rely on outside
science review only in the most complex cases.  
4. EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson should advocate for adequate resources for
IRIS and ensure they are used to the greatest possible effect.  
5. EPA should announce these reforms in a memorandum that also sets out
a streamlined six-step process for developing an IRIS profile:  (1) publish a
notice of assessment in the Federal Register; (2) open a docket for public to
add studies during staff literature review; (3) draft an assessment; (4) publish
the draft for public and agency comment; (5) revise the draft based on input
during the public comment process, and; (6) publish the final assessment to
IRIS.
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History of the EPA’s IRIS Process
EPA has restructured the IRIS process three times since 2004. During the Bush
administration, additional steps were added that provided OMB and other federal agencies
a special opportunity to influence the process. EPA’s current IRIS process eliminates some
steps; however, some of the steps in the new IRIS process are not contained in the chart.
Under the current process, OMB and federal agencies still have an opportunity to review
IRIS assessments before the public comment period.
Figure 1: The original IRIS profile development process.

Figure 2: The process after the Bush Administration’s first revisions.

Figures courtesy Environmental
Protection Agency.
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Figure 3: The process after the Bush Administration’s second revisions.

Figure 1,2, & 3: Hearing on Fixing EPA’s Broken Integrated Risk Information System, Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Science and Technology (Jun. 11, 2009).”

Figure 4: The current process.

Figure 4: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NEW PROCESS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF
INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM (May 21, 2009), available at http://epa.gov/iris/process.htm.
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Improving the Process for Setting the IRIS
Agenda
The principal purposes of the IRIS database are to identify hazards and help EPA and
other agencies prioritize toxic substances that are of concern. The basic toxicology
information contained in IRIS assessments along with other information collected by EPA,
such as the Toxics Release Inventory, provide a basis for making decisions about chemical
management. But the risk management process has its own set of procedural requirements
for determining how best to protect the environment and public health from hazards related
to toxic chemicals. These decisions are essentially separate from the risk assessment process,
and need not be made during the IRIS process.
Given the gaping holes in the IRIS database, it is essential that EPA develop and pursue a
well-considered process for completing the assessments necessary to complete IRIS profiles.
That process ought to reflect communication and cooperation between IRIS staff and other
EPA program officers, it ought to seek to balance of statutory needs and priorities of the
program offices, and it ought to be transparent so that the public and various stakeholders
will know what is under consideration. So far, however, EPA has focused on a few highprofile IRIS assessments, without offering up to the public any explanation for why these
assessments have been chosen at the expense of others.
EPA program offices that regulate toxic substances rely heavily on IRIS assessments to help
carry out their statutory responsibilities. The CAA’s HAPs program regulates emissions
of toxic substances.12 Under the program, EPA establishes standards for sources of toxic
air pollutants and then determines the residual risk associated with these substances once
industry implements the regulations. EPA program staff makes residual risk determinations
based on health hazard analyses, exposure data, and dose-response characterizations.13
The IRIS database should provide key information for those determinations, but it has critical
data gaps. Thirty-two of the 188 HAPs listed in the CAA have no IRIS assessment at all,
and 77 pollutants are listed in IRIS but do not have inhalation risk information. As a
result, EPA cannot easily evaluate residual risk for 109 of 188 listed substances.
Similarly, EPA program staff ’s implementation of the SDWA relies on human health
information for prioritizing substances to set primary drinking water standards. Their work
is also dependent on public health information for health risk reduction and cost analysis
in setting standards. Quantitative risk information is supposed to be included in IRIS, and,
indeed, IRIS provides information on all but three substances currently regulated under the
SDWA. In addition, 64 substances that have been nominated for regulatory consideration
do not have IRIS assessessments. Included in the most recent Contaminant Candidate List
are a range of pesticides and estrogen-like hormones for which there are no IRIS profiles.14
These missing assessments, as with HAPs, hinder EPA’s work in implementing the SDWA.
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IRIS is also critical in cleaning up Superfund sites. EPA guidance for using human health
information in risk assessments for Superfund states that if an IRIS assessment is available,
EPA need not seek out additional human health information.15 Unfortunately, IRIS
assessments are not available for 87 of the 275 high-priority substances the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) identified in 2007. For these
substances, EPA must look to other sources and make determinations about the quality of
the information before a risk assessment can be completed. Risk assessments are used to
determine whether cleanup action is warranted, to establish protective cleanup levels, and to
estimate residual risk after cleanup.
The IRIS database should be a resource for other program offices. The IRIS staff should
encourage open communication with other program offices to ensure that the IRIS database
is most useful to the program offices. For example, the CAA Amendments of 1990 direct
EPA to develop emissions standards for 188 specific HAPs, and then assess the “residual
risk” posed by the pollutants after industry has instituted the pollution controls needed to
meet the standards. The law provides only limited guidance to EPA on which assessments
to undertake first. The Office of Air and Radiation should consult with IRIS staff to help
develop such priorities.
EPA has generally provided lists of substances whose IRIS assessments had been
completed in the previous year, new substances nominated for assessment in a specific year,
and ongoing assessments that EPA expected to complete that year.16 In 2009, EPA only
provided information about substances for which literature searches had been completed.17
EPA provides additional information about the progress of assessments through IRISTrack,
but does not provide detailed information about how it has selected and prioritized
assessments, nor does it explain its strategy or goals for working through the large number
of assessments indicated by program offices.
The Obama administration has expressed a commitment to transparency through the
Open Government Directive, which lays out several goals for improving transparency,
including publishing information online, creating a culture of open government, and
making legislative, budgetary and regulatory materials more accessible. EPA should explain
its priorities for the IRIS program and account for data gaps on substances program offices
need to carry out their missions. In effect, EPA is providing data without providing the
underlying rationale for its decision-making, defeating the objective of the President’s
transparency initiative.
Recommendation
EPA should publish a clearly articulated IRIS agenda in the Federal Register each year. It
should describe in its agenda how it plans to complete the large number of assessments
needed to make the database current. When EPA develops this plan, it should give
consideration, where possible, to conducting assessments of similar or related chemicals
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at the same time. The agency should divide the assessments into groups based on factors
related to how complex they will be to complete and use those groupings to divide
the workload more evenly. EPA should also explain how it will complete high-profile
assessments without preventing the agency from completing all the other assessments.
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Removing the Barrier of Interagency Review
The interagency review process is a significant contributor to delay of IRIS assessments.
From 2003 to 2007, the number of full-time staff devoted to IRIS rose from 10 to 35. In
this period, the number of draft assessments set for interagency review rose from zero to
15, but the number of completed assessments was relatively stagnant – with five assessments
completed in 2003 but just two in 2007.18
Not only does the interagency review process contribute greatly to gumming up the works
of IRIS assessments, it also gives agencies that are themselves potentially regulated entities
the opportunity to assert undue influence or delay assessments by years or even decades.
The Department of Defense (DOD), for example, is the nation’s biggest polluter, yet the
interagency review process affords it a preferred seat at the table in establishing standards by
which it will be regulated, something no corporate polluter could even hope to achieve.
In her 2009 reforms, Administrator Jackson chose to keep in place two opportunities
for interagency review. The first is what is labeled “Step 3” in the new process: “Science
consultation on the draft assessments with other Federal Agencies and White House
Offices.”19 In a 2009 report, GAO noted that EPA’s use of the phrase, “White House
offices,” is vague, and does not provide sufficient information about what White House
offices are to be involved in this process. But based on the interagency review comments
available for substances assessed under the new process, the White House Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) seems to be the main driver, notwithstanding the fact that
it only employs two professional scientists. The second opportunity for interagency review
in Administrator Jackson’s 2009 process is labeled, “Step 6B,” “EPA-led Interagency Science
Discussion.” In brief, with this reform, Jackson asserted EPA control over the interagency
review process, where previously OMB coordinated interagency review through OIRA.
The core problem with interagency review is that it provides agencies that may have
conflicts of interest an opportunity to influence and delay risk assessments under the
IRIS process. One example is the reassessment of trichloroethylene, long-term exposure
to which has been linked to liver and kidney cancer and nerve damage. The substance is
used as an industrial degreaser by many industries, as well as by the DOD, Department of
Energy (DOE) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In 2004, EPA
commissioned a joint study from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) with DOD,
DOE, and NASA on human health effects of trichloroethylene.20 In response to the NAS
report, NASA released a bulletin discussing the potential impact of regulatory actions related
to trichloroethylene, including clean-up action.21 NASA and other agencies were then given
an opportunity to comment on the trichloroethylene draft assessment, a plain conflict of
interest for the agencies, since the agencies themselves, and their contractors, are subject to
the eventual regulation. Of course, public and private polluters are entitled to offer their
views and provide information to regulators during the public comment period. The issue
here is whether polluters should be given an up-front opportunity to comment on EPA
scientists’ findings about the hazards of the pollutants they discharge.

Interagency
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As that example demonstrates, the interagency review process provides other federal
agencies with a disruptive opportunity to inject policy considerations into the scientific
assessments developed under IRIS. For example, this year, OMB submitted comments to
the 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (dioxin) reassessment expressing its disappointment
that EPA did not calculate a “margin of exposure” in proposing a reference dose (RfD)
for dioxin.22 OMB argued: “Because the exposures of a proportion of the U.S. population
would be above any RfD, it would have been useful for EPA to define the nature and
magnitude of the risks at different levels of intake, the groups of the population most
at risk, and the major sources of exposure for any at-risk groups.” But decisions about
whether and how to subdivide the exposed population for purposes of an IRIS assessment
are science policy choices that do not belong in the IRIS process. These decisions should
be made through the regulatory process, based on the strength of data and other factors
without influence from potentially regulated parties, whose policy views are likely more
informed by potential cleanup costs than by unbiased scientific considerations.
By retaining this interagency review process, EPA signaled that it continues to support the
treatment of IRIS assessments as if they were themselves regulatory actions, rather than
the scientific underpinnings for subsequent regulatory actions. For example, interagency
review panels often call for additional explanation of factors related to regulatory action.
In comments on the draft dioxin assessment, agencies asked for EPA to provide additional
support for toxicity equivalent factors, which EPA explained were not used for the purposes
of making IRIS assessments, but would be useful for future regulatory applications.20 EPA
leadership of the interagency science review process should have resulted in better balancing
of EPA’s interests with those of other federal agencies, but since the new IRIS process took
effect, interagency comments have still resulted in delay, additional layers of analysis and calls
for more and more science review.23 The additional information supplied by federal agencies
could be provided during a public comment period, so the delay created by interagency
review does not justify the value of additional information shared by agencies.
A second problem with interagency review is that it provides additional avenues for industry
interests to influence or delay the IRIS process. Industry interests commonly devote
substantial resources to exploiting procedural opportunities to slow the process. And
indeed, delay is at least a partial victory for industry, because assessments often provide
significant basis for future regulations on toxic substances. As long as an industry can
produce the appearance of a controversy around a substance, it can delay any regulatory
action, and put off the day when it will have to conform to stricter regulation.
Industry tactics for delaying IRIS assessments are the product of years of experience
fighting regulations. The guiding principle for delaying regulations and any government
action that would protect people from hazards is to create a public perception of uncertainty
in the link between chemical exposure and adverse effects. Industry has used this strategy
for decades to delay regulations, win less stringent controls, and generate skepticism about
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science from the agencies, including EPA.25 Although industry manufactures this sense of
doubt in many ways, at the core, each tactic is related to the overarching strategy of delay.
Recent actions by the American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA) and the Methanol
Institute exemplify how industry can manipulate the interagency review process to sow
doubt and promote regulatory delay. EPA posted its original IRIS profile for methanol in
1988. The agency updated the profile in 1993, however it still lacks the two most critical data
points for a CAA HAP—an inhalation reference concentration and a cancer slope factor.
In 2002, EPA began the process of developing these numbers, and by 2009 had come up
with a draft of a new profile. At that point, AF&PA and the Methanol Institute instituted
a coordinated attack on EPA’s draft. AF&PA attacked the individual studies EPA used to
support the new inhalation reference concentration and the new cancer slope factor.26 The
Methanol Institute took on the studies that EPA used to support the overall conclusion
that methanol is likely to be a human carcinogen.27 Those studies were conducted by the
Ramazzini Institute, an Italian lab that specializes in long-term carcinogenesis studies that
industry believes overestimate chemicals’ carcinogenic potential. In its comments attacking
the Ramazzini methanol studies, the Methanol Institute went so far as to demand an audit of
the lab. Soon thereafter, the National Toxicology Program (NTP), an interagency program
housed in the Department of Health and Human Services, made a visit to the Ramazzini
labs and issued a report that was critical of the labs’ pathology practices.28 The report also
suggested that EPA conduct additional review of the Ramazzini results used in various
IRIS profiles. Immediately after receiving the report, EPA announced it would suspend
its assessment of methanol and three other chemicals currently under review in the IRIS
program.29
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The delay brought on by NTP’s review of the Ramazzini labs may be evidence of a shrewd
manipulation of the interagency review process by affected industry. At the very least, it will
provide them with the opportunity to dump additional studies that they have funded into
the docket. For instance, AF&PA hired a consulting company to conduct a review of EPA’s
draft IRIS assessment for methanol. The company, Exponent, has a long history of science
for hire that stretches back to tobacco industry efforts to generate research to discredit the
connection between smoking and cancer.30 Since then, Exponent has been involved in a
number of high-profile, industry-sponsored efforts to create a public perception that research
linking products to hazards is controversial, including tests of laminated glass for Ford, which
the company uses in litigation.31 Such industry-sponsored studies are not subject to the
guidelines set by the agencies and OMB for “quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity.” Indeed,
regulated industry has significant incentives to pay for studies that challenge agency results
that recommend regulation. Such studies affect the IRIS process in two major ways – they
slow it by requiring agencies to respond to petitions for correction of information, and they
foster a perception of scientific disagreement. Industry interests have several opportunities
to critique and discredit government science, but agencies are not provided with the same
capacity to critique and re-analyze research presented from outside entities.
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Public access to federally funded research is much greater than privately funded research.
Under the Data Access Act, federally funded research is subject to the Freedom of
Information Act, giving private entities the opportunity to request underlying data and other
information about federally funded studies. But privately funded studies are subject to no
such disclosure requirements. As a result, industry-funded studies like the one conducted
by Exponent for the AF&PA are effectively shielded from scrutiny by the media, the public,
public interest organizations, and even the agencies themselves.
Without such checks on their work, there can be little assurance that industry-funded
research meets the high standards of quality, objectivity, and independence required for use
in the IRIS program. For instance, AF&PA also attached to its comments a study critical
of EPA’s assessment published in the journal Regulatory Toxicology and Pathology. The journal
is sponsored by the industry-funded International Society of Regulatory Toxicology and
Pharmacology, and has been criticized by a group of toxicologists for lacking transparency
and editorial independence.32
One straightforward way to reduce the likelihood that bought-and-paid-for research finds
its way into the IRIS process is to require a simple conflict disclosure, modeled after existing
conflict disclosures adopted by scientific journals. Conflict disclosure would allow EPA,
other agencies, and outside observers to quickly and easily consider potential conflicts of
interest and account for any bias that might be built into industry-sponsored studies.33 Apart
from the problem of conflicts of interest, industry’s ability to delay the regulatory process
using research that is difficult to verify undermines EPA’s ability to do its job in a timely
manner.
In short, the interagency review process delays assessments without contributing to the
IRIS process in a productive way. EPA expends resources in responding to interagency
review comments and refining assessments multiple times before they are made available
to a broader public for further comment. The agency could devote more resources
to completing assessments if IRIS staff was not developing draft assessments to clear
interagency hurdles—concerns that are often motivated by risk management concerns that
are more appropriately raised during the development of actual regulations, rather than the
development of a scientific assessment of possible harms. In addition, because EPA divides
the review process into multiple steps, each of which requires EPA to wait and then reevaluate its assessment, the agency sometimes is forced to respond to the same objections
more than once.
Recommendations
The interagency review process should be eliminated and agencies should be given an
opportunity to comment during a public comment period that is made equally available to all
stakeholders. If significant science issues are raised in these public comments, EPA could then
choose to initiate a more formal process for agencies to share information and resolve disputes.
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In addition, EPA should assert more authority to question or re-analyze industry-sponsored
research or at least to be able to take conflicts of interest into account when considering
weight-of-the-evidence determinations about toxic substances. A conflict disclosure
requirement that provides information about identity of sponsors, what kind of support
they provided, the role of the sponsor in the research process, and the sponsors’ level of
control over the study and data, would enable EPA to make such assessments.
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Limiting Redundant Review
In her 2009 memo announcing the new IRIS process, Administrator Jackson wrote that
EPA would occasionally seek outside scientific review from the NAS and EPA’s Science
Advisory Board (SAB), but only in high-profile assessments of major importance.34 Since
then, however, EPA has chosen to focus the bulk of its IRIS energies on a handful of highprofile assessments, with the result that six assessments expected to be completed this year
have been recommended for SAB review: dioxin, arsenic (inorganic), arsenic (non-cancer
effects), trichloroethylene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and methanol. Half of these
assessments have already been reviewed by at least one outside panel of scientific experts:
inorganic arsenic, dioxin and trichloroethylene have had SAB reviews previously. Inorganic
arsenic was previously reviewed by the SAB from 2005-2006. Dioxin was previously
reviewed by SAB in 1995 and by NAS in 2006. Trichloroethylene was previously reviewed
by SAB in 2001 and by NAS in 2006. Often OMB encourages these science advisory board
meetings during the interagency review process.35
To be sure, NAS and SAB review can add an additional layer of scientific expertise to the
process. But it is a process that has already incorporated the expertise of EPA scientists,
who are, among other things, assessing existing scientific literature based on expert research.
In addition, the extra layer of review comes at the cost of greatly slowing down the process,
sometimes by years. In the case of trichloroethylene, the two SAB reviews have taken nine
years – the first SAB review was initiated in 2001, and the second SAB review has not yet
been completed.
Between the outside peer review process, public comments and additional reviews of
EPA’s scientific judgment delay assessments by focusing on details that may not be relevant
to the risk assessment task at hand, and contribute to cascading delays, making delay of
assessments so lengthy that new research emerges in the interim, requiring EPA to start again
from the beginning. All scientific questions can be studied virtually indefinitely. At some
point, assessments must be entered into the IRIS database so that regulators can get to work
protecting the public from harm. While it is important that IRIS assessments provide the
best available scientific information, the science advisory process furthers the myth that IRIS
assessments can be static answers about human health effects. EPA’s decision to wait for
unassailable answers undermines the goal of IRIS to be broadly informative. In addition,
redundant layers of review can have a demoralizing effect on EPA staff that prompts them
to rely only on the most deeply entrenched studies preventing them from incorporating new
research.
EPA could easily incorporate more expert advice without halting the process to wait for
additional SAB and NAS review, by inviting additional experts to comment on individual
assessments as part of the public comment period. Instead of asking these experts to
come to a consensus opinion, as NAS and the SAB do, EPA could simply solicit opinions
and comments on any problems with EPA’s draft. This would keep the assessment process
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moving forward and would prevent peer review from delaying the process. Including such
comments in the public comment process would also promote transparency of the peer
review process. Comments from outside experts would be published to a docket for the
assessment and therefore could be reviewed by all interested parties.
Recommendations
EPA should attempt to limit SAB review to the greatest extent possible. There will be
difficult and complicated assessments, where input from the SAB may add value, reduce
conflicts and provide EPA staff with needed oversight and outside expertise. But EPA
should strive to avoid multiple reviews by SAB and NAS. Further, EPA should make
decisions about how and when it will consult outside scientific expertise, not OMB. One
place where outside science review could add genuine value is when broader scientific
questions are raised, such as the development of toxicity equivalence factors, which compare
the relative toxicity of individual chemicals within a family of similar chemicals, or review
of classes of chemicals. In these cases, the expert opinions and additional guidance to EPA
provides clear added value, as such determinations are complex and may require additional
scrutiny, particularly in cases where EPA is evaluating techniques or approaches it has not
used previously.
If and when EPA program offices act on IRIS information and propose a regulatory action,
specific procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act, executive orders governing
review of regulatory actions, and statutory requirements under each specific statute should
govern the promulgation of regulations. This process is well-developed and provides
regulated industry and other stakeholders with ample opportunity to evaluate EPA’s proposal
and present information and perspectives to the process. EPA should forgo outside science
review aimed at resolving questions that are related to potential regulatory actions or risk
management decisions, rather than to the science underlying those decisions.
A nimbler IRIS process would also make it easier for EPA to revise assessments if new
research becomes available. In fact, EPA staff undertook the task in 2003 of identifying
assessments in the IRIS database that should be revised because of new research.33 At
its best, the IRIS database should be responsive to new information, and be flexible
enough that that EPA can incorporate new information to existing assessments relatively
quickly. Because other program offices rely so heavily on information in the IRIS database,
EPA should err on the side of information and provide the greatest possible amount of
information that is scientifically credible.
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IRIS assessments
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In short, expert peer review can be an important tool for supporting the findings of EPA,
but the agency should strive to keep redundant reviews of IRIS assessments by outside
science advisory boards to an absolute minimum.
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Putting EPA’s Resources to the Greatest Effect
EPA’s IRISTrack program paints a compelling portrait of just how much work remains
before IRIS is truly current. A compilation of status reports on EPA’s IRIS assessments
currently in progress, IRISTrack shows that 67 IRIS assessments are currently in process,
while 255 substances need assessments for EPA program offices to fulfill statutory
mandates, and 169 substances currently listed in the database have been identified by EPA
staff as being in need of updating to account for new information. EPA must complete
a significantly greater number of assessments each year to quickly clear the backlog of
assessments. If EPA were to complete these assessments in five years, it would have to
complete approximately 84 assessments each year – nine times the number of assessments
per year that it completed in the past year. Assessments cost money, and even if EPA
streamlines its process along the lines recommended in this paper, the agency will require
an increase in its IRIS budget from its current level of $14.5 million to approximately $100
million, with a commensurate increase in the number of full time staff to allow EPA to
complete enough assessments for the database to stay current.
Although the IRIS program has received increases in funding and staff since 2000, it has
not been able to complete enough assessments to meet the needs of EPA program officers
and other users of the database. The low level of productivity of the IRIS program was the
subject of House Science Committee hearings in 2009. The briefing memo for the hearing
suggested that 20 assessments per year was the bare minimum level of productivity for the
IRIS database to be relevant.37 Even that is, in all likelihood, an understatement of what is
needed. To complete the 478 assessments listed above at the rate of 20 per year would take
24 years. If the schedule includes the 77 HAPs listed but still missing inhalation values, it
would take EPA 25 years to complete all the statutorily-indicated assessments, without taking
on any new assessments. By contrast, at EPA’s current pace of nine assessments per year, it
will take 55 years for the IRIS program just to clear its backlog.
Simply dumping more money into the IRIS program will not fix the problem. EPA must
make more effective use of its resources. In fiscal year 2010, the IRIS program received
$5 million additional dollars and 10 additional staff to carry out its work.38 In 2010, six
assessments were referred for interagency review, eight are expected to complete the draft
development phase, and EPA expects to complete nine assessments this year.39
The unfortunate reality is that EPA’s new process for completing IRIS assessments has not
addressed root causes of delay: the interagency review process, interference from regulated
industry, excessive and redundant science review and inadequate strategic planning. Ideally,
EPA would strive to reduce burdens on the assessment development process by focusing on
a smaller number of key goals: reviewing toxicology information on toxic substances and
providing an opportunity for peer review and public comment on the agency’s assessment.
Reducing these burdens would ensure that interested parties would have an opportunity to
participate in the assessment development process and provide key oversight consistent with
the requirements of the scientific community.
Corrective Lenses for IRIS: Reforms to Improve EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System
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Recommendations
EPA should pursue two principal budget objectives with respect to IRIS. First, it should
devote a limited amount of resources to high-profile IRIS assessments. Doing so would
ensure that these high-profile or complex assessments are completed, but that they do not
interfere with EPA’s completion of other, easier-to-assess substances. The fraction of IRIS
program resources devoted to high-profile chemicals should have a firm cap, so as to put an
end to the current dynamic, in which EPA works on just a handful of the most difficult-tocomplete assessments.
Second, EPA should develop a budget request that relies on a determination of what would
actually be required to complete a target number of assessments. It should then add funding
for ongoing assessments of high-profile substances. Such an approach would ensure that
EPA would continue to complete assessments at a pace to keep the database up to date
without high-profile assessments cannibalizing resources.
Administrator Jackson has an important opportunity to back up her assertion that the IRIS
program is a key part of her chemical management strategy. The program needs sufficient
resources and support so that the database can support the work of other program offices
at EPA. Streamlining and simplifying the IRIS process would allow EPA to devote more
of the agency’s resources to completing assessments rather than responding to interagency
comments and submitting to outside science review. If the agency divided priorities between
a few high-profile assessments and a larger number of assessments that could be completed
more quickly, EPA could complete more assessments while still making progress on the
small number of high-profile assessments.
Finally, Congress should provide the IRIS program with the resources necessary to make
sure IRIS is able to meet the needs of the program offices, and to keep the database up to
date.

Corrective Lenses for IRIS: Reforms to Improve EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System

Page 20

Center for Progressive Reform

Conclusion
The reforms to the IRIS program implemented by EPA in May 2009 have not made the
IRIS program productive enough to support EPA’s statutory responsibilities with respect to
IRIS, or to the regulatory programs that rely on it so that they can do the important work of
protecting Americans from toxic substances. In particular, by prioritizing a small number of
high-profile assessments, retaining interagency review, and overusing NAS and SAB review,
EPA has fallen into the trap of continuing the appallingly low completion rate for IRIS
assessments.
EPA has the authority to implement all of these changes recommended in this paper,
with the exception of funding requests that will require appropriation by Congress. EPA’s
principles for chemical management state that “[c]lear, enforceable and practicable deadlines
applicable to the Agency and industry should be set for completion of chemical reviews, in
particular those that might impact sensitive sub-populations.”40 Under the EPA’s current
IRIS process, there is no way to set a clear or enforceable deadline for chemical review. If
Administrator Jackson wants to achieve a better, more protective chemical management
strategy, it is imperative that the IRIS program become nimbler and better able to fulfill the
needs of other offices at EPA to carry out their statutory responsibilities.
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Attachment 2

Setting Priorities for IRIS: 47 Chemicals that Should Move to
the Head of the Risk-Assessment Line
Executive Summary
EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) is the starting point for new regulations under
the Clean Air Act (CAA), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Scientists in the IRIS office produce
risk assessments of individual chemicals, which regulatory staff then combine with exposure
data and statute-based policy choices to write new emissions limits and cleanup standards. In
previous reports, the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) has described massive gaps in the
IRIS database, including more than 250 chemicals for which EPA’s air, drinking water, and
Superfund offices need robust risk assessments.1 In this white paper, we describe how EPA
should prioritize the work it will take to close those data gaps. We have developed a list of 47
chemicals that IRIS staff should move to the top of its list of priorities, based on the air toxics,
drinking water, and Superfund program offices’ most pressing needs.
Toxicology is predicated on the axiom that the dose makes the poison. IRIS profiles provide
EPA, state and local public health officials, and the public with information about the relevant
doses for hundreds of toxic substances. We recommend EPA improve its priority-setting
process for IRIS by taking a two-step approach to deciding which data gaps to fill first. As a first
step, EPA must foster better cooperation and communication between IRIS staff and their
colleagues in the air, drinking water and Superfund program offices, to ensure that the priorities
of risk assessors in the IRIS office parallel the priorities of risk managers in the program offices.
Second, EPA should take environmental justice into consideration and determine whether there
are patterns of unknown chemicals being emitted in large quantities in disadvantaged
communities.
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Air toxins

Table 1: Priority Chemicals List
Drinking water
Multi-media
contaminants
threats
1,2-DiphenylAcetamide1,3
hydrazine

Carbonyl sulfide

Superfund
pollutants
Polycyclic
aromatic
hydrocarbons
Arochlor 1260

Formaldehyde

Arochlor 1242

Hydrogen fluoride

Arochlor 1221

Lead compounds

Cobalt

Mercury
compounds
Methanol

DDT, O,P’

Methylene
chloride

Endrin ketone

Nickel compounds

Chromium(VI)
oxide

Phenol

Methane

Cadmium
compounds

Nickel

1,3-Dinitrobenzene
Acetochlor
ethanesulfonic
acid
Acetochlor
oxanilic acid
Alachlor
ethanesulfonic
acid
Alachlor oxanilic
acid
Diazinon

N-Nitrosodimethylamine
(NDMA)
N-Nitrosodiethylamine
(NDEA)
N-nitroso-di-npropylamine
(NDPA)
Terbufos

Environmental
justice concerns
1,1,2-Trichloroethane1,2,4,5

4-Aminobiphenyl1,2
Arochlors1,2

1,2-Dichloroethane1,2,3,4
Chlorobenzene4,5

Chromium2,3

Diaminotoluene4

Cobalt2,3

Hexachlorobenzene4,5

Ethylene oxide1,3

Hexachloroethane1,3,4,5
Methyl iodide5

2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-pdioxin1,2
Vanadium2,3

Phthalic
anhydride2,3
Quinone2
Urethane3

1

Air, 2Superfund,
Drinking water

3

Chemicals above
are released in the
following ZIP
codes: 170734,
2
70805,371730,
4
77541, 577571

In CPR’s last paper on IRIS’s information gaps, we identified 253 unique substances that need
new or updated IRIS assessments.2 In this paper, we selected the 47 substances from that list
that EPA should move to the front of the line. The IRIS program staff are currently working on
new assessments for just 17 of these 47 substances,3 underscoring our concern that statutory
priorities are not sufficiently factored into the IRIS agenda. The 47 unique substances listed in
2

CPR, Corrective Lenses for IRIS, supra note 1, at 2-3.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS); Request for Chemical
Substance Nominations for 2011 Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,827 (Oct. 18, 2010).
3
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Table 1 include: ten hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) in the greatest number of upcoming air
toxics standards; the ten highest-scoring Superfund priority substances; 11 substances listed on
the drinking water Contaminant Candidate List; eight substances that appear on more than one
list; and the ten highest-emitting HAPs in areas with environmental justice concerns.

Introduction
EPA’s three key statutes for regulating toxic chemicals in commerce are the Clean Air Act
(CAA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). These statutes share two characteristics
that make environmental regulation complex: they are media-specific, which balkanizes the
regulatory landscape; and they require EPA to quantify the risks of individual chemicals before
setting regulations.
At present, EPA takes nominations for new chemical risk assessments from Deputy Assistant
Administrators, Deputy Regional Administrators, federal agencies that participate in reviews of
draft IRIS assessments, and the public, then uses six criteria to select chemicals for IRIS
assessments from among the nominations. But this process has not been sufficient to push the
IRIS office to complete assessments in time for EPA program offices to regulate toxic
substances.
The priority setting process functions like a black box: We know the criteria EPA applies and
we know which IRIS profiles are completed, but we do not know how EPA applies these criteria
to the un-assessed and under-assessed substances to set IRIS priorities. Based on the large
number of chemicals identified by program offices that have not been assessed, we can infer that
EPA’s current process is not prioritizing assessments to meet the program offices’ needs.
In this paper, we propose a two-step process for prioritizing new chemical reviews in the IRIS
program: first, risk assessors from the IRIS office and risk managers from the regulatory offices
need to work together to develop a complete list of chemicals in need of IRIS assessments;
second, the chemicals should be prioritized in terms of the existing regulatory agenda and
environmental justice concerns.
EPA program offices provide public information about chemicals considered for regulation,
which we have parsed to develop a list of 253 substances that could be the starting point for
discussions between IRIS risk assessors and regulatory risk managers. The CAA HAPs have
been public since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 were made law; the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a program under CERCLA, periodically publishes a
list of priority chemicals; and, under the SDWA, the Office of Water must publish a
Contaminant Candidate List (CCL) every five years. This information gives the IRIS staff
guidance about chemicals of concern to EPA, but does not help them to prioritize their work.
3

Since IRIS staff cannot tackle all 253 substances at once, a more robust effort at coordination is
necessary, including regular meetings between the staff and managers of all offices to set shortand long-term priorities. Those priorities should be informed by environmental justice concerns.
Specifically, EPA should prioritize the assessment of chemicals that lack IRIS profiles and are
emitted in large quantities in communities with significant populations of poor and minority
residents and in localities where a large number of un-assessed chemicals are emitted together.
In this white paper, we profile five communities that bear the burden of numerous un-assessed
HAPs and multiple Superfund sites.
Improving priority-setting policies will put the IRIS staff on the right path, but the database will
remain outdated without reforms to the assessment process. Potentially regulated parties,
particularly industry and other federal agencies like the Department of Defense and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, have isolated IRIS as a choke point for regulation. Their
opposition has resulted in an IRIS program that can neither keep up with the demands that have
already been made, nor incorporate information about new substances. IRIS staff must consider
new ways to avoid the problem of ―information capture,‖ whereby potentially regulated parties
dump so much new data on the agency – and do so with such frequency – that new assessments
become mired in continuous controversy.

Setting Priorities, Step One: Improving Communication between
Regulatory Office and IRIS Staff
EPA program offices have specific deadlines and plans to complete regulatory actions on toxic
chemicals. The IRIS staff should be well-attuned to the deadlines and priorities of the program
offices, and strive to provide program offices with the best available risk assessment information
in a timely manner to support regulatory decisions. There should be regular communication and
interaction between the program office staff and IRIS staff to facilitate priority-setting and
ensure that priorities are consistent with the needs of the program offices.
The next three sections provide some additional details about the three programs and some
thoughts on prioritizing chemicals that are important to each program.
Hazardous Air Pollutants
The CAA Amendments of 1990 specify 188 toxic air pollutants that EPA must regulate through
a two-step process. First, EPA must issue ―technology-based‖ standards for all major sources of
HAPs. At this stage, EPA staff simply determine emissions limitations based on the average
emission limitation of the best performing 12 percent of existing sources. EPA has issued 96
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technology standards covering 174 ―major‖ and ―area‖ sources.4 In the second step of the HAPs
regulations, EPA must evaluate ―residual risks‖ associated with air pollutants eight years after
the technology-based standards are promulgated, in an effort to determine whether the
technology-based standards protect public health with ―an ample margin of safety.‖5
IRIS profiles are integral to the residual risk determinations. EPA considers an ample margin of
safety to be exposures below the reference concentration (RfC or inhalation value) listed in IRIS
for non-carcinogens, and the level at which added cancer risk does not exceed one in one
million.6 But the IRIS database is missing assessments or inhalation values for 107 of 188
HAPs, slowing progress toward completion of residual risk standards. In fact, EPA’s Science
Advisory Board (SAB) reviewed the Office of Air and Radiation’s (OAR) methodology for
completing two residual risk evaluations and implored EPA to complete IRIS profiles for all
HAPs in a timelier manner.7 They said that EPA’s alternate method of determining risk was too
simplistic, and recommended that EPA elaborate on the proposed method. But they stressed that
the best course of action was to complete IRIS profiles for all the HAPs.
Data gaps in IRIS’s HAPs coverage stymie public health efforts led by state and local
agencies, too. In 2005, the Mayor of Houston, Bill White, ordered a task force on air
pollution in the area. Houston’s Ship Channel is home to large number of petrochemical
refineries and other chemical plants, and has high concentrations of a broad range of HAPs.
The Task Force focused on 176 HAPs listed in EPA’s 1999 National Air Toxics Assessment
that were present in the 10 counties that comprise the greater Houston area. The researchers
expressed difficulty in developing risk characterizations for Houston-area HAPs: ―The
intrinsic challenges of comparing HAPs-related health risks are illustrated by the fact that
118 (67%) of the 176 HAPs examined by the Task Force were assigned to the uncertain risk
category. This decision was based on their collective judgment that there is insufficient
evidence on hand to ascertain whether these substances currently pose a significant threat to
the health and well being of Houston residents.‖ Of the 118 HAPs placed in the uncertain
risk category, 63 are missing IRIS profiles or lack inhalation values.
EPA completed the last of the technology-based standards in 2006, so it must issue all residual
risk standards by 2014. With that deadline in mind, and with input from OAR, IRIS staff should
set an agenda for completing risk assessments on all HAPs in an order that will pave the way for
4
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OAR's regulatory agenda. EPA has already finalized 16 residual risk standards and proposed or
requested comment on 17 others. IRIS and OAR staff should work together to determine how
the 13 HAPs covered by proposed standards but lacking key IRIS data could be assessed in time
to meet OAR’s regulatory timeline. A recent consent decree prompted by a Sierra Club lawsuit
sets deadlines for 16 more residual risk standards that cover 114 HAPs—43 of which lack
inhalation values in the IRIS database and should also be prioritized for review by IRIS staff.
CPR reviewed EPA’s proposed rules and the 16 other standards which EPA must propose under
the consent decree, and identified 123 HAPs in these upcoming standards.8 Table 2 highlights
the top 10 of those 123 HAPs, based on the number of upcoming rules in which they appear.
The Appendix (Table A2) provides a longer list—all 46 HAPs that appear in upcoming standards
but lack inhalation values or do not have IRIS values. Input from OAR would be valuable in
improving the usefulness of this priority list. OAR needs IRIS profiles for HAPs to complete the
residual risk standards, and OAR should share its needs with ORD, so IRIS profiles can be
completed in a timely manner.
Table 2: Hazardous Air
Pollutants with Insufficient IRIS Information in
Upcoming Residual Risk Rules
Chemical
Cadmium compounds*
Carbonyl sulfide
Formaldehyde
Hydrogen fluoride*
Lead compounds
Mercury compounds
Methanol
Methylene chloride
Nickel compounds
Phenol
* No IRIS profile information.

Human Health Effects: Cadmium
compounds
Cadmium compounds have been
linked to kidney disease, lung
damage, cancer, and fragile bones.
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE
REGISTRY, TOXFAQ FOR CADMIUM, (Sept.
2008), available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts5.pdf (accessed
Oct. 21, 2010).
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Pollutant Emissions: Group I Polymers and Resins, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,437-60,440 (Oct. 8, 2008).
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Superfund Pollutants
Superfund is a critical part of EPA’s overall mission. The Superfund program has a budget of
$1.3 billion; it makes up 12 percent of EPA’s total budget.9 Cleanup standards for Superfund
inform other waste management programs, including the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act and private-sector cleanup efforts. IRIS profiles are the first step in setting Superfund
standards and initiating work that radiates beyond Superfund.
Superfund sites are places of significant soil and groundwater pollution, often by multiple
contaminants. EPA prioritizes cleanup efforts based on whether contaminants pose an
immediate hazard or a longer-term cleanup effort. Sites that are not marked for emergency
response are added to the National Priorities List (NPL). After a site has been added to the NPL,
it undergoes a seven-step process through which EPA oversees the remediation of a site, a
process that begins with risk assessment.
The CERCLA requires ATSDR to periodically compile
Why ATSDR?
a list of ―high priority‖ substances.10 ATSDR generates
this list from substances that are found in sites on the
Dividing responsibilities across
NPL. The list is placed in a weighted priority order that
multiple agencies is one strategy to
takes into account the frequency with which substances
avoid agency capture. Congress
are found at sites on the NPL, the toxicity of the
created the ATSDR in 1986, after
substance, and the likelihood of human exposure to the
the integrity of EPA’s Superfund
substance at a site. ATSDR provides the IRIS staff with
program had been called into
quite a bit of useful information to make determinations
question by the actions of Reagan
about how to prioritize substances for IRIS assessment.
administration officials in charge
ATSDR updates the list periodically, with new
of the program.
substances being added and others removed as the sites
on the NPL change.11 Nonetheless, many substances remain on the list for years, because they
are common industrial chemicals, or are persistent environmental toxics. Even the longstanding
high priority chemicals lack sufficient coverage in IRIS – 17 substances that have been on
ATSDR’s list since 1997 do not have IRIS profiles (See Appendix, Table A4).
ATSDR’s list, like the CAA’s list of HAPs, provides an obvious indication of an EPA regulatory
office’s needs. But similar to its treatment of HAPs data gaps, EPA’s IRIS agenda does not
explain how it will address data gaps for substances on the ATSDR high priority list. There is no
formal relationship between the ATSDR list and the IRIS agenda process. Research conducted
9

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FY 2010 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF, 2, 6 (Apr. 2009) available at
http://www.epa.gov/budget/2010/2010bib.pdf (accessed Dec. 15, 2010).
10
42 U.S.C. § 9604(i).
11
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, CERCLA PRIORITY LIST OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES,
lists are available for 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007, available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/cercla/07list.html (accessed Sept. 16, 2010) [hereinafter ATSDR, CERCLA PRIORITY
LIST].
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by ATSDR should flow freely between ATSDR and the IRIS program – indeed IRIS was created
when EPA combined several disparate databases of human health information maintained by
various program offices at EPA. The Superfund program should support IRIS to the extent that
ATSDR is able to assist the IRIS program in completing assessments, identifying key studies,
and making judgments about weight-of-the-evidence evaluations of toxic chemicals.
Table 3: Top Ten ATSDR Priority Chemicals
not Listed in IRIS12
Chemical
ATSDR points13
Polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons
1316.98
Aroclor 1260
1177.77
Aroclor 1242
1093.14
Aroclor 1221
1018.41
Cobalt
1015.57
DDT, O,P'
1014.71
Nickel
1005.4
Endrin ketone
978.99
Chromium(VI)oxide
969.58
Methane
959.78

Human Health Effects: Nickel
Exposure to nickel dust has been linked to
respiratory problems including bronchitis
and reduced lung function. Occupational
exposures have been linked to lung and
nasal cancer.
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY,
TOXFAQ FOR NICKEL, (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts15.pdf (accessed Oct. 21,
2010).

Drinking Water Contaminants
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) requires EPA to set standards for limits on drinking
water contaminants. Unlike HAPs, which were specified by Congress, EPA is responsible for
identifying water contaminants. EPA identifies additional water contaminants that might be
candidates for regulation every five years by generating a new Contaminant Candidate List
(CCL).14 The lists contain recommendations both for chemicals and microbiological
contaminants. Since 1996, EPA has published three CCLs that contain 156 distinct chemical
substances.15 IRIS profiles are missing for 64 (41 percent) of these substances. Absence of an
IRIS profile hinders regulation of drinking water contaminants because the Water Office uses
health risk information to prioritize unregulated substances to monitor, as well as determine what
order to regulate water contaminants.

12

ATSDR, CERCLA PRIORITY LIST, supra note 11.
Points are assigned by ATSDR is based on an algorithm that utilizes the following three components: frequency
of occurrence at NPL sites, toxicity, and potential for human exposure to the substances found at NPL sites. See
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, CERCLA PRIORITY LIST OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES,
WHAT IS THE CERCLA LIST, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/cercla/index.asp (accessed Sept. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter ATSDR, WHAT IS THE CERCLA LIST].
14
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(B)(i).
15
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Announcement of the Drinking Water Contaminant Candidate List;
Notice, 63 Fed. Reg. 10,273 (Mar. 2, 1998); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Drinking Water Contaminant
Candidate List 2; Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 9,071 (Feb. 24, 2005); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Drinking Water Contaminant Candidate List 3 – Final, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,850 (Oct. 8, 2009).
13
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The SDWA requires the EPA Administrator to make a public health finding about a contaminant
before EPA moves to regulate the substance. The public health finding requires three
determinations: first, EPA must establish that the contaminant may have an adverse effect on
human health; second, the agency must determine that the contaminant is known or likely to
occur in public water systems; and third, EPA must determine that regulation through SDWA
presents a meaningful opportunity for reducing public health risks.16 Reference doses contained
in IRIS profiles are exactly relevant to the first determination. The IRIS program has not kept up
with demand to provide information about CCL substances, which makes it more difficult for
EPA to make the health risk related determinations required under SDWA.
Table 4 lists 11 of the 64 substances that appear in the CCLs that do not have IRIS profiles,
culled from the larger list because they are also tracked under the Unregulated Contaminant
Monitoring program. In the Appendix (Table A5), we identify nine additional substances EPA
tracks under the Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring program that do not appear on the
Contaminant Candidate Lists, but are missing IRIS profiles.
Table 4: UCMR Listed Substances also on CCL
without IRIS profiles
Chemical
1,2-diphenylhydrazine
1,3-Dinitrobenzene
Acetochlor ethanesulfonic acid
Acetochlor oxanilic acid
Alachlor ethanesulfonic acid
Alachlor oxanilic acid
Diazinon
N-nitrosodiethylamine (NDEA)
N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA)
N-nitroso-di-n-propylamine (NDPA)
Terbufos
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Human Health Effects: Ethylene Oxide
Ethylene oxide has been linked to miscarriage,
respiratory and nervous system effects.
Ethylene oxide is listed of programmatic
importance both for safe drinking water and as
a HAP.
AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY,
TOXFAQ FOR ETHYLENE OXIDE, (Jul. 1999), available at
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts137.pdf (accessed Oct. 21,
2010).

42 U.S.C. §300g-1(b)(1)(A).
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Setting Priorities, Step Two: Considering Environmental Justice
IRIS staff can use the regulatory offices’ legal obligations and administrative priorities to start
the process of choosing which chemicals need new or updated assessments, but those two factors
will still leave them with a substantial list. IRIS staff should further prioritize new assessments
by taking into consideration environmental justice concerns.
Environmental justice, as defined by EPA, means ―fair treatment and meaningful involvement of
all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development,
implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.‖17 In
practice, EPA’s policy for ensuring environmental justice places an obligation on EPA staff to
consider first, whether their actions disproportionately impact any group(s) of people, and
second, whether all affected groups have a meaningful opportunity for involvement in the
regulatory process.
In the IRIS assessment priority-setting context, IRIS staff could take into account the potential
for disproportionate impacts by analyzing emissions and exposure data for the unassessed HAPs,
CERCLA priority chemicals, and drinking water contaminants to determine where clusters of
those unassessed chemicals can be found. Over the next few pages, we profile five communities
where HAPs that have insufficient profiles are released in significant quantities. These five
communities were chosen because they are sites with a large diversity of toxic air pollutants and
have the largest number of HAPs without IRIS profiles. In addition to considering HAPs, we
also looked at the presence of Superfund sites, and toxic chemical releases listed in EPA’s Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI). After we selected the communities, we probed basic demographic
information from the 2000 Census, which is listed in the community profiles.
Our methodology is but one way that IRIS staff might take environmental justice into account
when prioritizing new assessments. These communities are subject to diverse exposure to toxic
chemicals through multiple pathways. We selected them based on the presence of the largest
number of exposures to substances that are missing IRIS profiles, but these communities are also
exposed to an even larger diversity of toxins.
One of EPA’s long-term goals is to better understand the cumulative impacts of multiple
toxins.18 Chemical-by-chemical information contained in IRIS – oral exposure limits, inhalation
values – is exactly the kind of toxicology information needed to complete cumulative risk
17

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY, ECONOMICS AND INNOVATION, EPA’S ACTION
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION (2010) available at http://epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/considering-ej-inrulemaking-guide-07-2010.pdf (accessed Nov. 2, 2010).
18
See, e.g., Thomas Burke, Overview of Cumulative Risk, presentation before Environmental Protection Agency,
Mid-Atlantic Cumulative Risk Workshop (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region3/environmental_justice/cumriskwkshop.htm (accessed Dec. 1, 2010).
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analysis. Cumulative risk assessments are highly dependent on toxicology information about
each of the various toxic substances and exposure pathways. If toxicology information is not
present, then the evaluation cannot be credibly completed. Cumulative risk assessments become
less credible as the number of data gaps increase. EPA must identify both where there is a large
diversity of exposure to toxic substances, and which toxic substances that appear in these areas
are missing critical toxicology information. The IRIS office should then strive to prioritize
substances that hinder cumulative risk assessment.
EPA’s environmental justice policies also require that staff consider whether all affected groups
are able to meaningfully participate in program decisions. IRIS staff can help more groups
participate more meaningfully in the regulatory process by finalizing new chemical profiles for
toxins that appear in communities like those profiled below. These communities often have
limited resources to devote to participation in the highly technical standard-setting and
permitting decisions that affect the quality of their air, water, and soil. The existence of IRIS
profiles for all relevant chemicals helps these communities advocate for themselves. The IRIS
office should strive to support environmental justice by identifying unassessed chemicals from
our list that appear in communities that are not adequately included in the decision making
process.

11

Geismer, LA 70734
Ascension Parish
Geismer, Louisiana is located about
30 miles south of Baton Rouge. It
is home to a large number of
petrochemical facilities, including
the largest manufacturing facility
for the chemical company BASF.
According to EPA’s Toxic Release
Inventory, residents of Geismer are
exposed to 94 toxic chemicals.

Blue markers represent sources of air pollution. Yellow markers are Superfund sites.

Total Releases
(lbs)

Toxics Release Inventory Information for 70734
Air Releases (lbs)
Water Releases
Land Releases (lbs)
(lbs)

9,522,750

2,530,641

6,738,084

27,569

Transfers to OffSite Treatment
Works (lbs)
226,457

Sources of Toxic Substance Exposures for 70734 and Ascension Parish
Air toxics not in IRIS
Superfund sites (70734)
Superfund sites (Ascension, LA)
14
2
5

Demographics Information for Geismer and Ascension Parish
70734
Ascension Parish
Race
White
Black
Native American
Asian
Pacific Islander
Hispanic/Other
Median household income
% below poverty line

58.7%
36.9%
0.0%
1.6%
0.0%
0.4%
$39,336
12.9%

77.6%
19.8%
0.4%
0.4%
0.0%
0.9%
$44,288
12.8%
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Baton Rouge, LA 70734
East Baton Rouge Parish
Baton Rouge is the capital of Louisiana.
It lies on the Mississippi River, about
eighty miles west of New Orleans. Baton
Rouge is home to a deepwater port
connecting the Mississippi River to the
Gulf of Mexico. Major industries in
Baton Rouge include petrochemical
production, plastic, rubber, and timber and
paper products, which contribute to air
and water pollution in the area.
According to EPA’s Toxics Release
Inventory, residents of Baton Rouge are
exposed to 116 different toxic chemicals.
Blue markers represent sources of air pollution. Yellow markers are Superfund sites.

Total Releases
(lbs)
9,961,982

Toxics Release Inventory Information for 70805
Air Releases (lbs)
Water Releases
Land Releases (lbs)
(lbs)
4,725,250

5,089,631

250

Transfers to OffSite Treatment
Works (lbs)
146,851

Sources of Toxic Substance Exposures for 70805 and East Baton Rouge Parish
Air toxics not in IRIS
Superfund sites (70805)
Superfund sites (East Baton Rouge
Parish)
12
1
18

Demographics Information for Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish
70805
East Baton Rouge Parish
Race
White
10.7%
51.8%
Black
86.8%
44.5%
Native American
0.2%
0.3%
Asian
0.8%
2.5%
Pacific Islander
0.0%
0.0%
Hispanic/Other
0.5%
2.8%
Median household income
$21,203
$42,173
% below poverty line
34.2%
17.6%
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El Dorado, AR 71730
Union County
El Dorado, Arkansas is located in the
southern part of the state, near the
Louisiana border. It was once a site
for oil extraction. More recently it is
the home to a diversity of chemicals
manufacturing, including agricultural
chemicals, automotive chemicals,
pesticides, bleaching agents and
synthetic dyes. The town of El
Dorado contains six Superfund sites.
EPA estimates residents of El
Dorado are exposed to 177 toxic
chemicals.

Blue markers represent sources of air pollution. Yellow markers are Superfund sites.

Total Releases
(lbs)

Toxics Release Inventory Information for 71730
Air Releases (lbs)
Water Releases
Land Releases (lbs)
(lbs)

7,749,243

1,209,550

4,369,657

1,464,241

Transfers to OffSite Treatment
Works (lbs)
705,794

Sources of Toxic Substance Exposures for 71730 and Union County
Air toxics not in IRIS
Superfund sites (71730)
Superfund sites (Union County)
14
6
7

Demographics Information for El Dorado, AR and Union County
71730
Union County
Race
White
Black
Native American
Asian
Pacific Islander
Hispanic/Other
Median household income
% below poverty line

66.2%
31.6%
0.3%
0.4%
0.0%
0.5%
$30,565
18.8%

64.8%
33.1%
0.3%
2.5%
0.0%
2.8%
$37,120
18.6%
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Freeport, TX 77541
Brazoria County
Freeport, Texas is located on the
Gulf of Mexico coast south of
Houston. It is home to a deepwater
port and large-scale petrochemical
manufacturing. Freeport also
maintains a liquefied natural gas
terminal. These sites are major
sources of air pollution in Freeport.
EPA reports that residents of
Freeport are exposed to 136 toxic
chemicals.

Blue markers represent sources of air pollution. Yellow markers are Superfund sites.

Total Releases
(lbs)

Toxics Release Inventory Information for 77541
Air Releases (lbs)
Water Releases
Land Releases (lbs)
(lbs)

5,377,060

2,452,712

2,535,381

69,489

Transfers to OffSite Treatment
Works (lbs)
319,470

Sources of Toxic Substance Exposures for 77541 and Brazoria County
Air toxics not in IRIS
Superfund sites (77541)
Superfund sites (Brazoria County)
9
2
10

Demographics Information for Freeport, TX and Brazoria County
77541
Brazoria County
Race
White
Black
Native American
Asian
Pacific Islander
Hispanic/Other
Median household income
% below poverty line

83.5%
12.1%
0.6%
0.4%
0.0%
19.8%
$33,933
23.5%

82.2%
11.2%
0.6%
4.6%
0.0%
2.1%
$60,784
9.2%
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La Porte, TX 77571
Harris County
LaPorte, Texas is on Galveston Bay
and is located in Houston’s Ship
Channel, which is home to a large
number of petrochemical facilities. In
2005, the Mayor of Houston ordered a
task force to investigate the effects of
air pollution in the Houston area,
including Harris County. Data gaps in
IRIS hindered the task force’s ability to
assess health effects. In addition to air
pollution, Harris County also contains
81 Superfund sites. According to EPA,
residents of LaPorte are exposed to 279
toxic chemicals.
Blue markers represent sources of air pollution. Yellow markers are Superfund sites.

Total Releases
(lbs)

Toxics Release Inventory Information for 77571
Air Releases (lbs)
Water Releases
Land Releases (lbs)
(lbs)

4,379,416

2,195,039

1,680,546

169,558

Transfers to OffSite Treatment
Works (lbs)
334,272

Sources of Toxic Substance Exposures for 77571 and Harris County
Air toxics not in IRIS
Superfund sites (77571)
Superfund sites (Harris County)
16
1
81

Demographics Information for LaPorte, TX and Harris County
77571
Harris County
Race
White
Black
Native American
Asian
Pacific Islander
Hispanic/Other
Median household income
% below poverty line

81.5%
6.7%
0.6%
0.7%
0.0%
7.9%
$56,552
7.2%

73.5%
18.7%
0.7%
5.1%
0.2%
1.3%
$42,598
15.9%

16

Streamlining the Process
Improving the priority-setting process for completing IRIS assessments is key to bringing the
IRIS database up to date. But considering that EPA has such a large number of assessments to
complete, it must also address how it manages its workload, and devise a process that allows the
IRIS program to complete more assessments each year. EPA should streamline the process by
setting goals for how many assessments to complete each year, drawing from substances of
programmatic importance; eliminating the interagency review process; relying on outside science
review only in the most complex cases; and preventing a few high-profile assessments from
impeding progress on others by completing those assessments on a separate track with a separate
budget.
In addition to structural problems with the IRIS process, regulatory agencies including EPA are
plagued by information overload.19 The regulatory process does not discourage—and actually
encourages—interested parties to submit large volumes of unfiltered information to agencies. As
a result, attention, not information, is in short supply in making regulatory decisions. The
consequences of this overload of information include an increased cost of participation in the
regulatory process – both to produce competing analyses and information and to review and
understand information submitted by other interests. Industry interests, having more resources to
participate in this process, dominate the process in terms of the amount of information submitted
to agencies and critical evaluation of information submitted by other interests. This creates an
echo chamber effect where agencies hear one perspective—industry’s—much more often than
others, creating a perception that the dominant perspective is the correct one.
This drop-off in pluralistic participation is described as ―information capture.‖ 20 By volume and
frequency of participation, better-funded industry interests influence agencies in favor of the
industry position. The IRIS program is subject to substantial information capture due to the
complexity of the assessment process and the highly technical nature of its work. The IRIS
office faces a prodigious backlog of assessments, and a stream of critique of its work. Industry
has a strong incentive to flood the agency with more information than it can effectively process.
Since there are no mechanisms in the regulatory process to limit interested parties from dumping
raw data into the record, there is too much information for agency staff to read through. The
agencies, battered by searching judicial review of their prior decisions, take it upon themselves to
respond to the content of all the submissions made to the agency in the course of the regulatory
process, in an attempt to insulate themselves against future litigation.
Although the IRIS process is not a regulatory process, it is subject to many of the same
challenges in terms of information overload. ORD staff is inundated from the start with
19

Wendy Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, DUKE L. J. Vol. 59, (2010)
[hereinafter Wagner, Filter Failure].
20
Id.
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information. Before a draft assessment is published, ORD staff comb through the literature and
produce a ―screening-level literature review,‖ which is then published in the Federal Register
and opened for public comment. Industry and other interests, including other federal agencies,
then submit additional studies and data that ORD staff must read and synthesize. Part of this
process is motivated by industry’s efforts to generate the appearance of controversy, a
deregulatory tactic that dates from the tobacco industry’s 1960s efforts to suppress and obfuscate
the relationship between smoking and cancer.21
Information capture is not unique to the IRIS process. But with such a large backlog of
assessments to complete, the IRIS process could be a good test case for strategies to reduce the
influence of excessive information. Placing some manner of filtering requirement on interest
groups, akin to limits placed by appellate courts on litigants, could provide some relief to
agencies in addressing information overload.22 Limits would encourage interested parties to
point to specific studies or findings relevant to issues with IRIS assessments. EPA staff could
then focus on a few problems and more quickly finish the weight-of-the-evidence determinations
required for IRIS.

Conclusion
CPR’s research has identified 253 substances awaiting IRIS assessments, an unacceptably high
number. EPA’s program offices need IRIS information to complete statutorily mandated tasks.
EPA should set a goal for working through these assessments, and then submit a budget proposal
that reflects the resources it would take to finish the work in that amount of time. Congress
should then provide the IRIS program with adequate funding to complete the work. Although
the current budget situation is such that many programs are being cut, our own back-of-theenvelope calculations estimate that the IRIS backlog could be cleared in five years for
approximately $100 million. In the context of the federal budget, this is not an unbearable
request. Indeed, it would amount to 0.003 percent of the $3.5 trillion in federal outlays from
FY2009. The IRIS process should be reformed to remove roadblocks and reduce the amount of
time it takes to complete assessments.
Moving forward, EPA should set priorities based on program office need, taking into
consideration environmental justice factors. Some mechanism for setting the IRIS agenda based
on expected needs of the program offices should be developed. The IRIS staff should determine
how many assessments must be completed based on the need from the program offices, not
based on the available budget. To the greatest extent feasible, program offices should give ORD
advance notice of chemicals of interest, so the IRIS staff can integrate these substances into the
21

DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR
HEALTH (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS) (2008).
22
Wagner, Filter Failure, supra note 19, at 1419.
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agenda-setting process. EPA should analyze whether certain communities are disproportionately
affected by chemicals for which there is no IRIS information and strive to prioritize these
assessments as well.
IRIS should push the regulatory agencies forward. It should also screen the epidemiology
literature for candidate substances and provide information that prods the program offices to act
under statutory authority. The relationship between the program offices and IRIS should be
symbiotic and reinforcing.

19

Appendix: Additional Tables of Chemicals Indicated by Program Offices
Not Listed in IRIS
Table A1: Substances identified by CPR as
CAA, SDWA, or Superfund data gaps that are
being assessed by IRIS staff
Chemical
Arochlors (polychlorinated biphenyls)1,2
Cadmium1
Carbonyl sulfide1
Chloroform1
Cobalt2,3
1,2-Dichloroethane1
1,4-Dioxane1
Ethylene oxide1,3
Formaldehyde1
Methanol1
Methyl tert-butyl ether3
Methylene chloride1
Nickel2
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons2
2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin1,2
Tetrachloroethylene1
Trichloroethylene1
1
Air pollutants; 2Superfund pollutants; 3Drinking
water contaminants
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Table A2: Hazardous Air
Pollutants with Insufficient IRIS Information in Proposed or Mandated Residual Risk Rules
Chemical
Benzyl chloride
Hexachlorobenzene
Bis(chloromethyl) ether
Hexachloroethane
Bromoform
Hydrogen fluoride
Cadmium compounds
Isophorone
Carbonyl sulfide
Lead compounds
Chlorine
Lindane
Chlorobenzene
Mercury compounds
Chloroform
Methanol
Chloromethyl methyl ether
Methyl iodide
Cyanide compounds
Methyl isothiocyanate
2,4-D
N,N-Dimethylaniline
Dibenzofuran
Nickel compounds
1,2-Dichloroethane
o-Toluidine
Dichloromethane
Pentachloronitrobenzene
Diethyl sulfate
Phenol
Dimethyl carbamoyl chloride
Selenium
2,4-Dinitrophenol
Styrene oxide
2,4-Dinitrotoluene
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane
1,4-Dioxane
Tetrachloroethylene
Dioxin and dioxin-like compounds
1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene
Ethyl acrylate
Trichloroethylene
Ethylene oxide
2,4,5-Trichlorophenol
Formaldehyde
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol
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Table A3: Hazardous Air
Pollutants with Insufficient IRIS Information in
the Hazardous Organic NESHAP
Chemical
Anthraquinone
Bromonaphthalene
Chloronaphthalene
Chrystene
Fluoranthene
Alpha-Naphthalene sulfonic acid
Beta-Naphthalene sulfonic acid
Alpha-Naphthol
Beta-Naphthol
Naphthol sulfonic acid
1-Naphthylamine
2-Naphthylamine
1,4-Naphthylamine sulfonic acid
1,2-Naphthylamine sulfonic acid
1-Nitronaphthalene
Tetrahydronaphthalene
These chemicals are not listed in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 with the other HAPs profiled in this paper, but they were
regulated by EPA under the Hazardous Organic NESHAP. We have included them because there is also insufficient IRIS
information on these chemicals.

Table A4: ATSDR Priority Chemicals Listed for
more than 10 years not in IRIS23
Chemical
ATSDR points24
Aroclor 1240
888.11
Radon-220
804.54
Tributyltin
802.61
Neptunium-237
802.13
Iodine-129
801.64
Gamma-chlordene
702.59
Americium
701.62
Carbon Monoxide
684.49
Chromium trioxide
610.85
Benzopyrene
603.00
Actinium-227
602.57
Ethoprop
602.13
Alpha-chlordene
601.94
Calcium arsenate
601.48
Hydrogen fluoride
588.03
Pentaerythritol
tetranitrate
545.59
Carbazole
534.52
23

ATSDR, CERCLA PRIORITY LIST, supra note 11.
Points are assigned by ATSDR is based on an algorithm that utilizes the following three components: frequency
of occurrence at NPL sites, toxicity, and potential for human exposure to the substances found at NPL sites. See
ATSDR, WHAT IS THE CERCLA LIST, supra note 13.
24
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Table A5: Water Contaminants Tracked under
Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring, not in
the CCL lists, not in IRIS
Chemical
2,2’,4,4’,5,5’-Hexabromobiphenyl
2,2,4,4’,6-Pentabromodiphenyl ether
Dacthal di-acid degradate
Dacthal mono-acid degradate
Lead-210
Metolachlor ethane sulfonic acid
Metolachlor oxanilic acid
Polonium-210
Terbufos sulfone
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